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Is the inferred preference from a choice to donate stronger when the choice was made 
under a mandated rather than the automatic default (nudged choice) legislative system? 
The answer to this is particularly important because families can, and do, veto the 
choices of their deceased relatives. In three studies, we asked American and European 
participants from countries that have either a default opt-in or default opt-out system to 
take on the role of a third party to judge the likelihood that an individual’s “true wish” 
was to actually donate their organs, given that they were registered to donate on the 
organ donation register. In each study, participants were randomly assigned to one of 
the organ donation legislative systems (default opt-in, default opt-out, mandated choice 
or mandatory). Overall, regardless of which country participants came from, they 
perceived the donor’s underlying preference to donate as stronger under the default opt-
in and mandated choice systems as compared to the default opt-out and mandatory 
donor systems. We discuss the practical issues that result from using default systems in 
the domain of organ donation and propose potential ways to ameliorate the uncertainty 
around inferences of underlying preference from a nudged choice. 
Word count: 196   
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Public Significance Statement 
This study suggests that signals of a donor’s underlying preference to donate are 
stronger when the choice from which preference is inferred was made under a mandated 
or default opt-in system than a default opt-out system. We found that ambiguous signals 
of underlying preference that are attached to default opt-out systems contribute to 
families’ veto decisions compared to active choice systems (opt-in, mandated-choice) 
which are substantially better at signaling intent than passive ones. We proposed 
potential solutions to ameliorate uncertainty around inferences of underlying preference 
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Underlying Wishes and Nudged Choices  
The shortage of transplantable organs remains a pressing global issue. This year 
in the US there are over 116,000 people on the waiting list to receive an organ and it is 
estimated that 20 people die each day while waiting on the list (Organdonor.gov, 2017). 
Similarly, 6,388 people in the UK are currently on the waiting list and approximately 
450 patients died while waiting on this list (NHSBT, 2017). To target this worldwide 
societal problem, behavioral interventions, such as nudges, have been used to provide 
practical solutions that are based on psychological and behavioral economic research. 
Nudges refer to behavioral change interventions that alter people’s behavior by 
modifying the choice context in such a way as to make the “better” option most 
salient/easy to select without substantially changing the underlying incentive structure 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). The prototypical example of a nudge is an automatic default, 
such as the ones often used in organ donation legislative system. The defaulted option 
is automatic enrolment onto the system that presumes one’s consent to donate his/her 
organs, and if individuals do not wish to donate, they have the freedom to opt-out. The 
objective of the present study is to examine the signals of one’s underlying preference 
based on being registered to donate on the Organ Donor Register (ODR), which is 
subject to different legislative systems (default opt-in, default opt-out, mandated 
choice, mandatory). In particular, we use this as a basis on which to assess people’s 
inferences regarding the strength of a donor’s underlying wish to donate. This is 
motivated by issues regarding family refusal rates with the NHS figures showing that 
families refused donation from 505 registered donors in the last five years (BBC, 2017). 
We begin by presenting evidence regarding the rationale for proposing defaults, and the 
evidence regarding their efficacy in increasing donation rates, before discussing the 
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current findings regarding reasons for which families veto their deceased relative’s 
wishes to donate.  
Rationale for defaults in organ donation legislative systems  
The rationale behind an automatic default is that it can bridge the gap between 
a good intention (e.g. to donate one’s organs) and the effort needed to implement that 
intention into practice (i.e. psychological barriers) (Shepherd, O’Carroll, & Ferguson, 
2014). Defaults can reduce contemplation costs and negative emotions that arise from 
thinking about one’s mortality, especially given that matters around death are rarely 
discussed in many societies (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Byrne & Thompson, 2001; Glasson 
et al., 1994; Shepherd, et al, 2014). Defaults also provide the decision-maker with 
important signals from policy-makers as to what ought to be the appropriate behavior 
in situations of uncertainty (Davidai, Gilovich, & Ross, 2013; Johnson & Goldstein, 
2003; McKenzie, Liersch, & Finkelstein, 2006). In fact, several studies have shown that 
default opt-out systems have substantially increased registered donations (Abadie & 
Gay, 2006; McKenzie et al., 2006; Shepherd et al., 2014; van Dalen & Henkens, 2014). 
For instance, Rithalia, McDaid, Suekarran, Myers, & Sowden (2009) reviewed five 
studies comparing donation rates before and after the introduction of legislation for 
presumed consent and found that donation rates in Austria rose from 4.6 donors per 
million population (pmp) to 27.2 donors pmp over a 5-year period; In Belgium, kidney 
donations increased from 10.9 to 41.3 pmp during a 3-year period, and in Singapore, 
kidney donations increased from 4.7 to 31.3 per year over a 3-year period.  
Vetoing decisions and reasons for them 
Whilst automatic defaults, such as default opt-out systems, for organ donation 
appear to increase donation rates, it is important to highlight that most organ donation 
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legislative systems, default or otherwise, include a clause that allows the final decision 
to donate to be made by family members (Den Hartogh, 2012). This means that in effect 
family members can veto the decision made by their deceased relative. In fact, families 
vetoing decision is claimed to be one of the leading reasons for the gap between supply 
and demand of organs (Abadie & Gay, 2006; Barber, Falvey, Hamilton, Collett, & 
Rudge, 2006). In 2010, NHSBT reported that more than 500 families have vetoed organ 
donations despite being informed that their relative was on the NHS ODR; this 
translated into an estimated 1,200 people missing out on potential life-saving 
transplants (NHSBT, 2016).  
Several studies have examined the factors that influence families’ decisions 
regarding the overruling of their deceased relative’s wishes (Exley, White, & Martin, 
2002; Mossialos, Costa-Font, & Rudisill, 2008; Rosenblum et al., 2012; van Dalen & 
Henkens, 2014). There is good evidence to suggest that if the deceased relative had 
made their decision known to their family in advance (an unambiguous signal of 
preference), then the family is more likely to honor their deceased relative’s wishes 
(DeJong et al., 1998; Radecki & Jaccard, 1997; Siminoff & Lawrence, 2002). 
Consistent with this, evidence from survey work showed that 96.7% of US citizens 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2013) and 88% of UK citizens 
(NHSBT, 2015) would consent to the donation of a deceased relative’s organs if the 
deceased's wishes were made known in advance to the family. In reality, however, the 
wishes of the donors are often not known to the family, as revealed by studies showing 
that less than half of Europeans and North Americans had raised the subject of organ 
donation with their family (Eurobarometer, 2007; Spital, 1995). From this, one 
speculation is that, just as the default option in a country’s organ donation legislative 
system may signal to the individual what ought to be the appropriate behavior (Johnson 
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& Goldstein, 2003), it can also act as a signal to the family as to their deceased relative’s 
underlying preference. In other words, when faced with decisions to consent on behalf 
of their deceased relative, defaults may also influence families’ perceptions of the 
deceased’s true underlying preference to donate given that the deceased was registered 
to donate. This is because strength of preference and choice satisfaction vary between 
default systems (i.e. personally made choice in opt-in vs. externally made choice in opt-
out); personally choosing leads to greater satisfaction in the choice made (Botti & 
McGill, 2006; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). Therefore, strength of preference 
and choice satisfaction is likely to be perceived by families as weaker under a default 
opt-out system because it involves a passive choice to donate compared to a default 
opt-in system where an active choice to donate is made.  
Why might this be the case? In an explicit consent system (i.e. default opt-in), 
consent is expressed through some overt communication which can be seen as 
providing reliable evidence that a decision was made. In addition, active choices of this 
kind are made through a free self-selection process thereby affirming one’s personal 
agency in the choices one makes (Osman, 2014). The meaning attached to the act of 
donation is seen as an altruistic inclination hence representing a stronger strength of 
signal of underlying preference to donate. This is different from a presumed consent 
system (i.e. default opt-out), where the absence of an objection is recorded as consent 
which can potentially mute the strength of a signal of one’s underlying preference to 
donate. In addition, a default opt-out system sends a signal to the potential donor and 
their family that organ donation is a socially preferred choice (or recommendation by 
policy makers) (I. G. Cohen, Lynch, & Robertson, 2016). Indeed, Davidai et al. (2013) 
has shown that participants assign a lower value to the act of being a donor in the default 
opt-out system compared to the default opt-in system. Given that donors rarely 
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communicate their donation wishes with their families, their underlying preference to 
donate are often inferred from the ODR and this is likely to be weaker and more 
ambiguous when a passive choice is made. The consequence of this is that it adds 
uncertainty to the families’ decision when deciding whether to donate their deceased 
relative’s organs. As mentioned, in the event of uncertainty, families are more likely to 
refuse consent. Therefore, by implication, the stronger the signal of underlying 
preference to donate is, given the type of organ donation legislative system, the less 
likely it is that families will refuse their relatives’ wishes to donate.  
To date, there has been much interest in the effects of organ donation 
legislations, such as the effect of implementing defaults in different organ donation 
legislations in generating donors (van Dalen & Henkens, 2014), families’ attitudes and 
beliefs to decide whether to consent to organ donation (Exley et al., 2002), and 
individual’s willingness to donate their own or their relative’s organs (Mossialos et al., 
2008). There has not, however, been any dedicated examination of whether there are 
differences between default systems (opt-in vs opt-out) regarding the strength of signal 
of the donor’s underlying preferences to donate. Our review of the literature shows that 
inferences of underlying preference from choice behavior play an important role in the 
donation process and, without greater understanding, we cannot accurately predict or 
evaluate the consequences of new policies that involve defaults (Bowels, 1998). In 
other words, the effectiveness of such policies would depend both on the preferences 
they induce or evoke (Sunstein, 1993) and, in turn, the inferences relatives make in 
these instances. 
In the present study, we investigate the perceived diagnosticity of an 
individual’s registration on an ODR for inferring their underlying preference. From a 
Bayesian perspective, the diagnosticity of an item of evidence, here registration on the 
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ODR, is determined by the likelihood ratio. The likelihood ratio is the ratio of obtaining 
that evidence in the event that the underlying hypothesis is true (the deceased relative’s 
underlying preference were to donate their organs - ‘hit’ rate) as opposed to obtaining 
that evidence in the event that the underlying hypothesis is false (the deceased relative’s 
underlying preference were to not donate their organs - ‘false positive’ rate), 
( )
( )'
P registration want to donate
P registration DON T want to donate


. Where the likelihood ratio is 1, the evidence is just as 
likely to occur whether the hypothesis is true or false and is therefore maximally 
uninformative. Where an individual is automatically registered to donate, one might 
expect more false positives than when a direct choice is made, thus reducing the 
likelihood ratio towards 1, and decreasing the diagnosticity of the ODR registration. 
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that people are sensitive to subtle sources of 
influences on the diagnosticity of evidence (Harris, Corner, & Hahn, 2013; Lagnado, 
Fenton, & Neil, 2012).  
In the current study, we investigate people’s sensitivity to the influence of organ 
donation legislative systems under which registration was made for judging the 
diagnosticity of that registration. Specifically, we investigated this across four systems: 
default opt-in (everyone is automatically a non-donor unless one registers to be a donor), 
default opt-out (everyone is automatically a donor unless one objects), mandated choice 
(everyone is required by law to state in advance whether they are willing to be a donor), 
and mandatory donor (everyone is required by law to be a donor and there is no option 
to change this). From this, we hypothesize that: 
1. People recognize the consequences of the different framings of the decision to 
be a registered organ donor. They, therefore, see registration as differentially 
representative of an individual’s underlying preference to donate, in the 
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following order: Default opt-in > Mandated choice > Default opt-out > 
Mandatory Donor.  
2. If Hypothesis 1 is supported, then families making decisions on the basis of their 
beliefs about the deceased’s underlying preferences to donate will be perceived 
by participants as more likely to agree to donation in line with the predictions 
of Hypothesis 1. 
 In the current study, we also elicit the relevant parameters to determine the 
degree to which these results are consistent with a Bayesian framework. 
General Method 
In general, the materials presented in Study 1-3 were the same, except for some 
additional questions in Studies 2 and 3. These additional questions were based on the 
manipulations regarding the samples we used: Study 1 involved US citizens (the US 
has a default opt-in system), Study 2 involved citizens from European countries that 
has a default opt-in system, and Study 3 involved citizens from European countries that 
has a default opt-out system. It was essential to present a set of studies that 
systematically address the hypotheses we identified, therefore we carefully changed as 
few details between the studies as possible. Given the similarities between these studies, 
and to assist the reader, we present the methods and results of the three studies together 
to facilitate a better understanding of the overall pattern of findings. For all three 
experiments ethics approval from QMUL college ethics board was granted, 
QMERC2014/54. 




Study 1. A total of 493 US citizens (Opt-in Policy) recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk1 took part in the online survey 256 females; aged 18-72 years, Mage = 
35.65 years, SD = 11.65 years), and were compensated $0.50 for their participation.  
Study 2. A total of 401 European citizens from countries with a default opt-in 
system (Germany, Denmark, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Romania, UK) were recruited 
from Prolific Academic2 (244 females; aged 18-72 years, Mage = 35.50 years, SD = 
12.76 years), and were compensated $0.50 for their participation.  
Study 3. A total of 400 European citizens from countries with a default opt-out 
system (Austria, Spain, France, Italy, Belgium, Sweden, Greece, Finland, Poland, 
Portugal, Turkey, Slovenia, Croatia, Czech Republic, and Norway) were recruited from 
Prolific Academic (261 females; aged 18-60 years, Mage = 29.01 years, SD = 8.27 
years), and were compensated $0.50 for their participation.  
Design, Materials, and Procedure 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of four experimental conditions 
(Figure 1): Study 1: Default opt-in (n = 122), mandated choice (n = 128), default opt-
out (n = 118), and mandatory donor (n = 125) with four dependent variables (Perceived 
belief of the donor’s underlying preference to donate; Perceived likelihood estimates of 
a relative consenting to donate; Relative’s consent expressed as a binary choice; 
Perceived diagnosticity of people’s intention to donate measured by Bayesian 
Likelihood Ratio). Study 2: Default opt-in (n = 101), mandated choice (n = 100), 
default opt-out (n = 101), mandatory donor (n = 99). In addition to the dependent 
                                                           
1 An online platform for recruiting participants. 
2 An online platform for recruiting participants. 
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variables in Study 1 (except for relative’s consent expressed as a binary choice which 
was replaced with dropdown list reasons for relatives consenting or vetoing donation), 
we also included two other questions (these are presented in more detail in the next 
section), and minor modifications to the elicitation of prior belief question. Study 3: 
Default opt-in (n = 99), mandated choice (n = 100), default opt-out (n = 99), mandatory 
donor (n = 102). The dependent variables were identical to those included in Study 2. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE. 
Study 1. Participants were told that this was a social experiment designed to 
investigate the topic of organ donation. Participants were presented with a 21-item 
questionnaire (see Supplementary Material – Part 2). The questionnaire first provided 
the definition of organ donation and, based on this information, participants were 
required to answer a question to elicit prior beliefs about people’s underlying 
preferences to donate, 1) P(want to donate): “Out of 100 people in the U.S., for how 
many do you think their true preference is to donate their organs?” 3 ,4 A fictional 
scenario immediately followed in which participants read details about a person named 
Mark who lives in an area that falls under a particular organ donation legislative system 
(depending on the experimental condition participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the four organ donation legislative systems: default opt-in, default opt-out, mandated 
choice, or mandatory donor – see Figure 1).  
                                                           
3 In preparation of the design and materials for the three studies that are presented here, we carried out 
a pilot study with UK participants. In this study, the introduction of a prior belief question designed to 
elicit preferences to donate was not presented at the start of the questionnaire, and responses could have 
been influenced by other details presented in the experiment, therefore in this paper, we presented the 
prior belief question at the start of the question for the three main studies. Full details are provided in 
Supplementary Material – Part 1. 
4 We used a frequency format to elicit the relevant Bayesian parameters as this has been shown to be an 
easier way for participants to provide responses (see also, e.g., Gigerenzer & Hoffrage (1995)). 
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In all four conditions participants were explicitly told that Mark was registered 
as a donor. They were also told that Mark was involved in a fatal accident leaving his 
vital organs intact. Following on from this, participants were asked 2) “How likely do 
you think it is that Mark’s true preference was to donate his organs?” to elicit perceived 
belief of underlying preference to donate, on a scale of 1(Mark definitely did not want 
to donate his organs) to 100 (Mark definitely did want to donate his organs). In addition, 
two other questions were presented to assess what actions should follow given the news 
that Mark suffered a fatal accident. Participants were asked 3) “How likely is it that 
John will agree to his Uncle’s organs being donated?”; responses were provided on a 
scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely) to elicit perceived likelihood estimates of 
a relative consenting to the donor’s decision to donate. Finally, participants were asked 
4) “What will John decide to do, will he donate his Uncle’s organs?” so as to elicit a 
binary response (consent, veto) as to the relative’s decision. 
Questions 5 and 6 elicited the relevant conditional probabilities for calculating the 
likelihood ratio, which is a measure of the perceived diagnosticity of the deceased’s 
registration on the ODR. Participants were asked 5) “If we assembled 100 people whose 
true preference is to DONATE their organs, how many of them do you think will be 
registered as organ donors on the …. system?”. And then asked 6) “If we assembled 
100 people whose true preference is NOT TO DONATE their organs, how many of them 
do you think will be registered as organ donors on the …. system?”, on a scale of 0-100 
(where “…” is the organ donation legislative system participants were assigned to). 
Study 2 and Study 3. Participants were presented with an 18-item questionnaire 
(see Supplementary Material – Part 3). The main set-up is the same as in Study 1 but 
with minor modifications. First, questions that had the term “true preference” were 
replaced with the word “want” so that the question can be better understood. Second, 
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the cover story now describes the respective organ donation legislative systems before 
eliciting participant’s prior belief, Question 1) “Out of 100 people living in this country, 
for how many do you think would want to donate their organs?”. Followed by Question 
2) “How likely do you think it is that Mark wanted to donate his organs?”, the scale has 
now explicitly labeled the midpoint which ranges from 0 (Mark definitely did not want 
to donate his organs, 50 (Mark is equally likely to donate or not donate his organs), to 
100 (Mark definitely did want to donate his organs). After responding to questions 1 
and 2, participants were then told about John and were asked to provide ratings to two 
additional new questions 3) “To what extent does being registered to donate under the 
…  system provide a clear indication that Mark wanted to donate his organs?”, on a 
scale of 0 (Not at all clear) to 100 (Absolutely clear); this question was designed to 
elicit perceived signal of intent to donate, and 4) “How likely it is that John believes 
that Mark wanted to donate his organs?”, on a scale of 0 (John believes Mark definitely 
did not want to donate his organs), 50 (John thinks it is equally likely that Mark wanted 
to donate his organs as didn’t), to 100 (John believes that Mark definitely want to donate 
his organs); this question was designed to elicit the likelihood estimates of relative’s 
belief of the donor’s underlying preferences to donate.  
Depending on the response to Question 5) “How likely it is that John will agree to 
his Uncle’s organs being donated?”, participants were presented with additional new 
question 6) “Why do you think it is highly unlikely/moderately 
unlikely/likely/moderately likely/highly likely that John will donate Mark’s organs?”, 
which replaced Question 4 (relative’s consent expressed as a binary choice) in Study 1. 
Participants were presented with up to eleven options as candidate reasons and an 
option for “none of the above” (five different reasons were presented for a “highly 
likely”, “moderately likely” and “likely” judgments, and eleven different reasons were 
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presented for “highly unlikely” and “moderately unlikely” judgments) from a 
dropdown menu. The options presented to people were based on a prior study on 
potential causes for family refusal decisions (Ghorbani et al., 2011) and the most 
frequent reasons that emerged in practice (Vincent & Logan, 2012). The reasons 
participants could select from were: it is a highly traumatic time for relatives and it’s 
just not something they can think about; lack of understanding of the organ donation 
process; denial and rejection of brain-death criteria; the hope for a miracle; fear about 
organ donation trade and unknown organ destination; religious beliefs; insecurity about 
the brain-death diagnosis; unsure about the deceased’s wish to donate; belief in body 
integrity about death; fear of objection by other family members; and there is lack of 
evidence to indicate that the deceased wanted to donate; but note that this is by no 
means an exhaustive list. Finally, participants were presented with two questions to 
elicit the likelihood ratio, Question 7) “If we assembled 100 people who want to 
DONATE their organs, how many of them do you think will be registered as organ 
donors on the … system?” and Question 8) “If we assembled 100 people who DO NOT 
WANT to DONATE their organs, how many of them do you think will be registered as 
organ donors on the … system?”, on a scale of 0-100.  
For all three studies, participants were asked a series of demographic questions 
(e.g., age, gender, religion), questions regarding their own organ donation status and 
their view on organ donation (e.g. whether they agree with an default opt-out system, 
willingness to agree to donation if loved one’s wishes are unknown, who should decide 
donation in the event of death, etc.) 
Results 
Perceived belief of the donor’s underlying preference to donate 
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The findings were broadly in line with our first hypothesis such that the 
participant’s perceived belief of the donor’s (i.e. Mark’s) underlying preference to 
donate reflected sensitivity to the four different organ donation legislative systems 
(Figure 2). Overall, the evidence revealed that the organ donation legislative system 
had a significant effect on participants’ perceived belief of the donor’s underlying 
preference to donate [Study 1: F(3, 492) = 74.69, p < .001, η2 = .31; Study 2: F(3, 400) 
= 41.55, p < .001, η2 = .24; Study 3: F(3, 399) = 24.39, p < .001, η2 = .16]. Across the 
three studies, looking at the effect sizes, the total variance accounted by the organ 
donation legislative was small to moderate in size.5 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE. 
For Study 1 and 2, the participants’ perceived belief of the donor’s underlying 
preference to donate decreased in the following order: Mandated choice = Default opt-
in > Default opt-out > Mandatory donor. Planned pairwise comparisons confirmed this 
pattern: The default opt-in system was perceived as a stronger indicator of underlying 
preference to donate when compared with the default opt-out system [Study 1: t(489) = 
9.00, p < .001, d = 1.20; Study 2: t(188) = 5.75, p < .001, d = 0.81]; and the mandatory 
donor system [Study 1: t(489) = 12.65, p < .001, d = 1.51; Study 2: t(194) = 7.47, p < 
.001, d = 1.06]. The default opt-out system was judged as a stronger indicator of 
underlying preference to donate when compared with the mandatory donor system 
[Study 1: t(489) = 3.49, p = .001, d = 0.43; Study 2: t(195) = 2.23, p = .027, d = 0.32]. 
The mandated choice system was judged as a stronger indicator of underlying 
preference to donate when compared with the default opt-out system [Study 1: t(489) = 
7.78, p < .001, d = 1.07; Study 2: t(198) = 8.14, p < .001, d = 1.15]; and the mandatory 
                                                           
5 J. Cohen (1988) provided a benchmark to define small (.1), medium (.3) and large (.5) effects. 
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donor system [Study 1: t(489) = 11.46,  p < .001, d = 1.40; Study 2: t(192) = 9.96,  p < 
.001, d = 1.41]. There was no significant difference in underlying preference to donate 
between the default opt-in system and mandated choice system [Study 1: t(489) = 1.34, 
p = .181, d = 0.18;  Study 2: t(182) = 1.11, p = .269, d = 0.16]. 
For Study 3, the participants’ perceived belief of the donor’s underlying 
preference to donate decreased in the following order: Default opt-in > Mandated 
choice > Default opt-out = Mandatory donor. Planned pairwise comparisons confirmed 
this pattern: The default opt-in system was judged as a stronger indicator of underlying 
preference to donate when compared with the default opt-out system [Study 3: t(195) = 
7.31, p < .001, d = 1.04]; mandated choice system [Study 3: t(196) = 3.16,  p = .002, d 
= 0.45]; and mandatory donor system [Study 3: t(198) = 7.35, p < .001, d = 1.04]. The 
mandated choice system was judged as a stronger indicator of underlying preference to 
donate when compared with the default opt-out system [Study 3: t(197) = 3.99, p < .001, 
d = 0.57]; and the mandatory donor system [Study 3: t(200) = 4.06,  p < .001, d = 0.58].  
There was no significant difference in underlying preference to donate between the 
default opt-out system and the mandatory donor system [Study 3: t(199) = .17, p = .864, 
d = 0.02]. 
Perceived signal of intent to donate 
The findings were broadly in line with our first hypothesis. Participants’ 
perceptions of the donor’s (i.e. Mark’s) intention to donate reflect sensitivity to the four 
different organ donation legislative systems (Figure 3); this question was not asked in 
Study 1, but was asked in Study 2: F(3, 400) = 98.77, p < .001, η2 = .43, and Study 3: 
F(3, 399) = 60.73, p < .001, η2 = .32.   
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE. 
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For Study 2, the participants’ perceptions of the donor’s intention to donate 
decreased in the following order:  Mandated choice = Default opt-in > Default opt-out 
> Mandatory donor. This is consistent with the pattern found for perceived belief of the 
donor’s underlying preference to donate. Planned pairwise comparisons confirmed this 
pattern: Default opt-in system was perceived as a stronger signal of intent to donate 
when compared with the default opt-out system [Study 2: t(188) = 8.37, p < .001, d = 
1.78]; and the mandatory donor system [Study 2: t(159) = 12.66, p < .001, d = 1.79]. 
The mandated choice system was perceived as a stronger signal of intent to donate when 
compared with the default opt-out system [Study 2: t(166) = 9.77, p < .001, d= 1.38]; 
and the mandatory donor system [Study 2: t(140) = 13.93, p < .001, d = 1.98]. Similarly, 
the default opt-out system was perceived as a stronger signal of intent than the 
mandatory donor system [Study 2: t(185) = 5.23, p < .001, d = 0.74]. There was no 
significant difference for signal of intent to donate between the default opt-in system 
and the mandated choice system [Study 2: t(190) = .93, p = .355, d = 0.13].  
For Study 3, the participants’ perceptions of the donor’s intention to donate 
decreased in the following order: Default opt-in > Mandated choice > Default opt-out 
> Mandatory donor. Planned pairwise comparisons confirmed this pattern: The default 
opt-in system was perceived as a stronger signal of intent to donate when compared 
with the default opt-out system [Study 3: t(180) = 9.80, p < .001, d = 1.39]; the mandated 
choice system [Study 3: t(195)= 3.00, p = .003, d = 0.42]; and the mandatory donor 
system [Study 3: t(171) = 11.43, d= 1.61, p < .001]. The mandated choice system was 
perceived as a stronger signal of intent to donate when compared with the default opt-
out system [Study 3:  t(189) = 6.89, p < .001, d= 0.98]; and the mandatory donor system, 
[Study 3:  t(181) = 8.74,  p < .001, d= 1.23]. Similarly, the default opt-out system was 
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perceived as a stronger signal of intent to donate than the mandatory donor system 
[Study 3: t(196) = 2.25, p = .025, d= 0.32].   
Perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s belief of the donor’s underlying 
preference to donate 
The findings were broadly in line with our second hypothesis such that the 
perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s belief of the donor’s underlying 
preference to donate reflected sensitivity to the four different organ donation legislative 
systems (Figure 4). Overall, the evidence revealed that the organ donation legislative 
system had a significant effect on participants’ perceived likelihood estimates of the 
relative’s belief of the donor’s underlying preference to donate [this question was not 
asked for Study 1, but was asked in Study 2: F(3, 400) = 64.23, p < .001, η2 = .33; and 
Study 3: F(3, 399) = 29.84, p < .001, η2 = .18].  
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE. 
For Study 2, the perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s belief of the 
donor’s underlying preference to donate decreased in the following order: Mandated 
choice = Default opt-in > Default opt-out > Mandatory donor. Planned pairwise 
comparisons confirmed this pattern: Perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s 
belief of the donor’s underlying preference to donate were higher in the default opt-in 
system compared to the default opt-out system [Study 2: t(199) = 7.06, p < .001, d = 
0.99]; and the mandatory donor system [Study 2: t(197) = 9.06, p < .001, d = 1.28]. 
Similarly, the default opt-out system had higher perceived likelihood estimates 
compared with the mandatory donor system [Study 2: t(198) = 2.10, p = .037, d = 0.30]. 
The mandated choice system had higher perceived likelihood estimates when compared 
with the default opt-out system [Study 2: t(181) = 10.41, p < .001, d = 1.47] and the 
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mandatory donor system [Study 2: t(178) = 12.78,  p < .001, d = 1.81]. There was no 
significant difference between the default opt-in system and the mandated choice 
system [Study 2: t(174) = 1.86, p = .064, d = 0.26]. 
For Study 3, the perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s belief of the 
donor’s underlying preference decreased in the following order: Mandated choice = 
Default opt-in > Default opt-out = Mandatory donor. Planned pairwise comparisons 
confirmed this pattern: Perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s belief of the 
donor’s underlying preference to donate were higher in the default opt-in system 
compared to the default opt-out system [Study 3: t(396) = 6.43, p < .001, d = 0.90]; and 
the mandatory donor system [Study 3: , t(396) = 8.18, p < .001, d = 1.18]. The mandated 
choice system has higher perceived likelihood estimates compared with the default opt-
out system [Study 3: t(396) = 4.75, p < .001, d = 0.66] and the mandatory donor 
system[Study 3: t(396) = 6.50, p < .001, d = 0.93]. There was no significant difference 
for perceived likelihood estimates between the default opt-in system and mandated 
choice system [Study 3: t(396) = 1.69, p = .092, d = 0.24]; and between the default opt-
out system and mandatory donor system [Study 3 :t(396) = 1.71,  p = .088, d= 0.24]. 
Perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s decision to consent 
The findings broadly supported our second hypothesis such that perceived 
likelihood estimates of the relative’s decision to consent to donate their family 
member’s organs reflected sensitivity to the four different organ donation legislative 
systems (Figure 5). Overall, the evidence revealed that the organ donation legislative 
system had a significant effect on participants’ perceived likelihood estimates of the 
relative’s decision to consent to donate [Study 1: F(3, 492) = 21.78, p < .001, η2 = .12; 
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Study 2: F(3, 400) = 22.12, p < .001, η2 = .14; Study 3: F(3, 399) = 5.88, p = .001, η2 = 
.08].  
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE. 
In Study 1, the perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s decision to 
consent to donate their family member’s organs decreased in the following order: 
Mandated choice = Default opt-in > Default opt-out > Mandatory donor. This is 
consistent with the pattern found for the perceived belief of the donor’s underlying 
preference to donate. Planned pairwise comparisons confirmed this pattern: 
Participants’ perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s decision to consent to 
donate were significantly higher under the default opt-in system compared to the default 
opt-out system [Study 1: t(489) = 3.02, p = .003, d = 0.40] and the mandatory donor 
system [Study 1: t(489) = 6.57, p < .001, d = 0.79]. Similarly, perceived likelihood 
estimates were higher under the mandated choice system compared to the default opt-
out system [Study 1: t(489) = 3.90, p < .001, d = 0.53] and the mandatory donor system 
[Study 1: t(489) = 7.50, p < .001, d = 0.92]. The default opt-out system was also 
perceived as more likely to lead to family consent than the mandatory donor system 
[Study 1: t(489) = 3.47, p = .001, d = 0.45]. There was no significant difference in 
perceived likelihood estimates when comparing the mandated choice system and the 
default opt-in systems [Study 1: t(489) = .84, p = .399, d = 0.11].  
For Study 2, the perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s decision to 
consent to donate their family member’s organs decreased in the following order: 
Mandated choice = Default opt-in > Default opt-out = Mandatory donor. Planned 
pairwise comparisons confirmed this pattern: Participants’ perceived likelihood 
estimates of the relative’s decision to consent to donate were significantly higher under 
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the default opt-in system compared to the default opt-out system [Study 2: t(195) = 3.86, 
p < .001, d = 0.55] and the mandatory donor system [Study 2: t(197) = 5.74, p < .001, 
d = 0.81]. Similarly, perceived likelihood estimates were higher under the mandated 
choice system compared to the default opt-out system [Study 2: t(174) = 5.44, p < .001, 
d = 0.77], and the mandatory donor system [Study 2: t(181) = 7.68, p < .001, d = 1.09]. 
There was no significant difference in perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s 
decision to consent when comparing the mandated choice system and the default opt-
in system [Study 2: t(188) = 1.34, p = .181, d = 0.19]; and between the default opt-out 
system and the mandatory donor system [Study 2: t(196) = 1.52, p = .131, d = 0.21]. 
In Study 3, the perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s decision to 
consent to donate their family member’s organs decreased in the following order: 
Mandated choice = Default opt-in = Default opt-out > Mandatory donor. Planned 
pairwise comparisons confirmed this pattern: Participants’ perceived likelihood 
estimates of the relative’s decision to consent to donate were significantly higher under 
the default opt-in system compared to the mandatory donor system [Study 3: t(396) = 
4.06, p < .001, d = 0.59]. Similarly, perceived likelihood estimates were higher under 
the mandated choice system compared to the mandatory donor system [Study 3: t(396) 
= 2.93, p = .004, d = 0.41]. The default opt-out system has a higher perceived likelihood 
estimates than the mandatory donor system [Study 3: t(396) = 2.20, p = .028, d = 0.31]. 
There was no significant difference in the perceived likelihood estimate of relative’s 
decision to consent when comparing the mandated choice system and the default opt-
in system [Study 3: t(396) = 1.14, p = .257, d = 0.16], and between the default opt-in 
system and the default opt-out system [Study 3: t(396) = 1.85, p  = .065, d = 0.26]; as 
well as between the mandated choice system and the default opt-out system [Study 3: 
t(396) = .72,  p = .474, d = 0.10]. 
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The type of organ donation legislative systems was also significantly related to 
the binary decision of whether or not participants thought the relative would donate 
their deceased family member’s organs: Study 1 (the only study in which this question 
was included), χ(3) = 18.71, p < .001. We present the percentage of participants that 
believe the relative would consent to donation under each organ donation legislative 
system: Default opt-in system (92.6%), default opt-out system (94.9%), mandated 
choice system (96.1%), and mandatory donor system (82.4%). However, this measure 
was less sensitive, as compared to the other questions presented in the three studies.  
Reason for Donating 
In general, the organ donation legislative system in the participants’ country 
(default opt-in or default opt-out) was significantly related to the reason they gave as to 
why the relative would consent to donate the deceased family member’s organs (this 
question was not asked for Study 1, but was asked for Study 2 and Study 3), χ(9) = 23.90, 
p = .004; but not significantly related to the reasons for the relatives veto decision, χ(13) 
= 17.55, p = .176. Table 1 and Table 2 show the frequency of each of the reasons chosen 
for consenting or vetoing decisions under each organ donation legislative system. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE. 
Perceived diagnosticity of people’s intention to donate 
In addition to the ratings above, we also elicited participants’ subjective 
probability estimates for the likelihood ratio 





P registration want to donate




and the prior, P(want to donate).  
 The findings broadly supported our second hypothesis such that perceived 
diagnosticity of people’s intention to donate, as assessed by the revealed likelihood 
ratios, again, these reflected sensitivity to the four different organ donation legislative 
systems (Figure 6). A one-way ANOVA6 revealed a significant effect of organ donation 
legislative system on perceived diagnosticity of people’s intention to donate [Study 1: 
F(3, 415) = 9.53, p < .001, η2 = .065; Study 2: F(3, 304) = 14.82, p < .001, η2 = .13; 
Study 3: F(3, 336) = 12.78, p < .001, η2 = .103].  
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE. 
For Study 1, the perceived diagnosticity of people’s intention to donate 
decreased in the following order: Mandated choice = Default opt-in > Default opt-out 
= Mandatory donor. Pairwise comparisons confirmed this pattern: The default opt-in 
system was perceived as more diagnostic of underlying preferences to donate than the 
default opt-out system [Study 1: t(73) = 3.30, p = .001, d = 0.55];  and the mandatory 
donor system [Study 1: t(77) = 3.35, p = .001, d = 0.55]. The mandated choice system 
was also perceived as more diagnostic than the default opt-out system [Study 1: t(111) 
= 3.15, p = .002, d = 0.43]; and the mandatory donor system [Study 1: t(124) = 3.19, p 
= .002, d= 0.43]. There was no significant difference in perceived diagnosticity between 
                                                           
6 78 participants from Study 1, 97 participants from Study 2, and 64 participants from Study 3 provided 
a false positive rating of 0, and were not included in this analysis, since the likelihood ratio is undefined 
in this case. Note that the predicted Bayesian posterior is 1 in such cases. Whilst, arguably, unrealistic, 
these responses can be included in calculating the mean of the Bayesian predictions in the subsequent 
analysis.  
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the default opt-in system and the mandated choice system [Study 1: t(140) = .82, p = 
.414, d = 0.13]; and between the default opt-out system and the mandatory donor system 
[Study 1: t(184) = .42, p = .679, d = 0.05]. 
For Study 2, the perceived diagnosticity of people’s intention to donate 
decreased in the following order: Mandated choice > Default opt-in > Default opt-out 
> Mandatory donor. Pairwise comparisons confirmed this pattern: The default opt-in 
system was perceived as more diagnostic of underlying preferences to donate than the 
default opt-out system [Study 2: t(56) = 3.03, p = .004, d = 0.59]; and the mandatory 
donor system [Study 2: t(50) = 4.11, p < .001, d = 0.83]. The mandated choice system 
was also perceived as more diagnostic than the default opt-in system [Study 2: t(88) = 
2.06, p = .042, d = 0.36], the default opt-out system [Study 2: t(69) = 3.58, p = .001, d 
= 0.62]; and the mandatory donor system [Study 2: t(67) = 4.04, p < .001, d = 0.70]. 
Also, the default opt-out system was perceived as more diagnostic than the mandatory 
donor system [Study 2: t(164) = 2.62, p = .010, d = 0.38]. 
For Study 3, the perceived diagnosticity of people’s intention to donate 
decreased in the following order: Mandated choice = Default opt-in > Default opt-out 
> Mandatory donor. Pairwise comparisons confirmed this pattern: The default opt-in 
system was perceived as more diagnostic of underlying preferences to donate than the 
default opt-out system [Study 3: t(68) = 3.39, p = .001, d = 0.60];  and the mandatory 
donor system [Study 3: t(333) = 4.91, p < .001, d = 0.73]. The mandated choice system 
was also perceived as more diagnostic than the default opt-out system [Study 3: t(93) = 
3.36, p = .001, d = 0.53]; and the mandatory donor system [Study 3: t(86) = 4.19, p < 
.001, d = 0.64]. The default opt-out system was perceived as more diagnostic than the 
mandatory donor system [Study 3: t(175) = .88, p = .033, d = 0.31]. There was no 
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significant difference between the default opt-in system and the mandated choice 
system [Study 3: t(128) = .43, p = .666, d = 0.07]. 
Direct Ratings vs Bayesian Ratings  
 The present results indicate a rational basis for participants’ different belief 
ratings across the different organ donation legislative systems. Because of the scale of 
the likelihood ratio (0 - ∞), it is, however, difficult to directly compare these results 
with participants’ direct ratings of the deceased’s underlying preference to donate. For 
this purpose, we collected participants’ prior beliefs, enabling the calculation of 
Bayesian predictions of participants’ likelihood ratings of the donor’s underlying 
preference to donate using Bayes’ Theorem7:   
( )
( ) ( )
( )
P want todonate P registration want todonate
P want todonate registration
P registration
 
 =  
Figure 7 suggests that there is a seemingly good fit between the ratings predicted 
from Bayes’ Theorem (using participants’ provided parameter estimates calculated 
from the formula above) and direct belief ratings (i.e. participants’ perceived belief of 
the donor’s underlying preference to donate). A strong correlation between direct belief 
ratings and those predicted from their Bayesian conditional probabilities suggests a 
significant association between the Bayesian model to the experimental data [Study 1: 
r(492) = .54, p < .001; Study 2: r(401) = .39, p < .001; Study 3: r(400) = .42, p < .001]. 
Indeed, the ordinal pattern of results is identical across the predicted and directly 
elicited ratings. However, participants seemed to perceive the mandated choice 
condition (Study 1) and the default opt-in condition (Study 3) as more diagnostic of the 
                                                           
7 Three participants from Study 1, five participants from Study 2, and three participants from Study 3 
were not included in this analysis, as both their hit rate and false positive estimates were zero, which 
resulted in an undefined predicted posterior. 
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donor’s underlying preferences than their Bayesian parameter estimates would predict. 
Nevertheless, on the whole, the effects of the organ donation legislative system appear 
well captured within a Bayesian framework.    
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE. 
The impact of demographics on response patterns in Study 1-3  
The demographic questions presented to all participants at the end of each 
experiment required that they indicate: 1) whether they were on the ODR, 2) whether 
they knew anyone that was on the ODR, 3) whether they were blood donors, 4) whether 
they would consent to donating their loved one’s organs even if their wishes were 
unknown, 5) whether organ donation was deemed as forbidden in their religion, and 6) 
whether they agree with the idea of a default opt-out system. In general, the key findings 
hold when including the above six factors as covariates (Table 3).  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE. 
Across the three studies (N = 1,323), the majority of the samples were non-
religious (52%), much of the remainder identified themselves as Christian (40%). For 
95% of the participants, organ donation was not forbidden in their religion. The sample 
also consisted of about 50% blood donors, 66% who knew someone who is registered 
as an organ donor, and 56% who agree with the idea of an opt-out system. In the event 
of death, participants agreed that the deceased person’s wishes should be respected 
(75%), with a small minority believing that the family should have a final say (16%), 
and the remaining participants indicating they don’t know (7%). Across the three 
studies, it appears that less than 50% of the participants have knowledge of the current 
organ donation legislation in their country (Table 4).  
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INSERT TABLE 4 HERE. 
Individual level analysis based on participants’ donor status  
In the following set of analyses, irrespective of the organ donation legislative 
system participants were assigned to in the experiments, we explore their donor status 
as a potential basis on which they made their responses between default opt-in European 
countries (Experiment 2) and default opt-out European countries (Experiment 3).8 First, 
participant’s donor status was significantly associated with a country’s organ donation 
legislative system (even if they did not necessarily know what that system was – see 
section “The impact of demographics on response patterns in Study 1-3”), 2(1) = 
25.92, p < .001. Overall, there were more organ donors in a country with a default opt-
in system (60.2%) compared to a default opt-out system (39.8%). When it came to 
participant’s perceived belief of the donor’s (i.e. Mark’s) underlying preference to 
donate, estimates were higher from organ donors (M = 80.33, SD = 20.03) than non- 
donors (M = 70.57, SD = 25.33) in countries with a default opt-in system, t(399) =4.30, 
p < .001. And similarly, in countries with a default opt-out system, estimates were also 
higher from organ donors (M = 79.90, SD = 18.99) compared to non-donors (M = 72.14, 
SD = 22.69), t(398) =3.46, p = .001. However, participant’s donor status was not 
significantly associated with their perceived signal of the donor’s (i.e. Mark’s) intention 
to donate their organs in default opt-in countries, t(399) =.27, p = .787; and default opt-
out countries, t(398) = 1.75, p = .081. On the other hand, organ donors (M = 77.16, SD 
= 22.39) gave higher likelihood estimates of the relative’s belief of the donor’s (i.e. 
Mark’s) underlying preference to donate compared to non-donors (M = 73.44, SD = 
                                                           
8 Note that these analyses set out to offer additional insights from the data but donor status was not 
elicited as one of the independent variables in the study. Therefore, there isn’t an even size of donors vs 
non-donors. Due to a large amount of individual level analysis conducted on this, and for readers that 
wish to inspect these details further, we have included the additional analyses in the Appendix – Part 4. 
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22.99) from countries with a default opt-out system, t(398) = 2.42, p = .016. But in 
countries with a default opt-in system, participant’s donor status had no significant 
impact on likelihood estimates, t(399) = 1.64, p = .102. Furthermore, organ donors (M 
= 4.34, SD = .84) gave higher likelihood estimates of the relative’s decision to consent 
to donate their family member’s organs as compared to non-donors (M = 4.08, SD = 
1.00) from countries with a default opt-in system, t(399) = 2.86, p = .004. Similarly, 
organ donors (M = 4.16, SD = .86) gave higher likelihood estimates of the relative’s 
decision to consent to donate their family member’s organs as compared to non-donors 
(M = 3.95, SD = .91) from countries with a default opt-out system, t(398) = 2.24, p = 
.026.  
General Discussion 
The focus of this study was to investigate whether being registered to donate 
one’s organs in an explicit consent (default opt-in or mandated choice) system is judged 
in the same way as a presumed consent (default opt-out) system. To achieve this, the 
present study examined third-party judgements as a way of gaining insights into 
inferred underlying preference from nudged choices (under default opt-in or default 
opt-out systems). The motivation for doing this was to simulate the kind of information 
families are faced with when making decisions as to whether to donate their deceased 
relative’s organs, as a way to consider a possible reason for high family refusal rates, 
namely the strength of signals of underlying preference to donate from choices under 
different organ donation legislative systems.  
In the main, the findings across three studies supported Hypothesis 1 which is 
that people are sensitive to the framing of organ donation legislative systems under 
which a decision to donate is made. More specifically, when an individual has been 
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‘defaulted’ into donation under a default opt-out or mandatory donor system, 
participants perceived the donor’s (i.e. Mark’s) underlying preference to donate as 
weaker than when that choice was made actively under a mandated choice or default 
opt-in system (Study 1-3). This pattern was consistent with the perceived signal of the 
donor’s (i.e. Mark) intent to donate (Study 2 and 3 only). Subsequently, our findings 
supported Hypothesis 2 which is that families making decisions on the basis of their 
belief about the deceased’s underlying preference to donate will be perceived by 
participants as more likely to agree to donate. Indeed, the same pattern was revealed in 
participants’ perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s belief of the donor’s (i.e. 
Mark) underlying preference to donate (Study 2 and 3 only), and perceived likelihood 
estimates of the relative’s decision to consent to donate a family member’s organs 
(Study 1 and 2, except for Study 3 where no difference was found between default opt-
in and default opt-out systems). That is, these perceived likelihood estimates were 
judged as weaker under a default opt-out or mandatory donor system compared to a 
default opt-in or mandated choice system. 
Moreover, consistent with the patterns found in Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, 
the perceived diagnosticity of this evidence (i.e. Mark’s registration on the ODR across 
the different organ donation legislative systems) for inferring the underlying preference 
of the donor’s underlying preference to donate was stronger when he was registered 
under the default opt-in or mandated choice system compared to default opt-out or 
mandatory donor systems (Study 1-3); and participants’ direct ratings were broadly in 
line with the predictions of a Bayesian formalization. 
Across the three studies, participants gave different reasons for the relative (i.e. 
John) consenting or vetoing donation under each organ donation legislative system. The 
general reason in the default opt-in and mandated choice systems were that “he actively 
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made a choice to opt-in and donate his organs” and “it is important to respect the 
deceased’s wish”. The reason for participants consenting to donate in the default opt-
out and mandatory donor system was “Mark didn’t opt-out during his lifetime means 
he wants to donate” and “Mark couldn’t opt-out of becoming a donor anyway” 
respectively. This shows that, among the reasons for consenting to donation, 
participants were sensitive to the different systems under which the donor (i.e. Mark’s) 
was registered to donate.  
What are the implications of these findings? Evidence suggests that people 
believe that the best way to obtain consent is for each individual to decide for 
themselves rather than leaving this decision to the family (Spital, 1993, 1995, 1996). 
Indeed, our study shows that a large majority of participants indicated that the 
deceased’s wishes should be respected no matter what the family thinks. Our findings 
show that when participants know that an individual has registered their decision to 
donate through some overt signal (i.e. under a mandated choice or a default opt-in 
system) this is likely perceived as a less ambiguous signal of a preference to donate. 
The signal generated from an active decision process typically encourages the agent to 
explicitly express a positive statement of intent, that is, request to donate or objection 
to donate. From the relatives’ perspective, an active decision of this kind is easier to 
infer what the deceased would have wanted because the deceased recorded a positive 
wish to donate or objection to donate, as oppose to no objections to donate in the case 
of the default opt-out system. Ultimately, the question to ask is whether presumed 
consent can increase the number of people on the ODR, and at the same time represent 
a good signal of preference so that it maintains a high family consent rate as well. Based 
on the evidence from this study, it appears that presumed consent acts as a weaker signal 
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of underlying preference to donate, and may lead to sustained or higher family refusal 
rates than active choice to donate.   
Lastly, the individual level analysis, irrespective of the experimental conditions 
(i.e. the four different organ donation legislative systems) participants were assigned 
to, revealed that participants’ donor status has an impact on their responses to the 
dependent variables (except for perceived signal of intent to donate). Overall, registered 
organ donors gave higher estimates for the perceived belief of the donor’s (i.e. Mark’s) 
underlying preference, perceived likelihood estimate of the relative’s belief of the 
deceased’s underlying preference to donate (except in default opt-out countries), and 
perceived likelihood estimate of the relative’s decision to consent to donate their family 
member’s organs as compared to non-donors in countries with a default opt-in and 
default opt-out system. In practice, this could potentially mean that if there is no clear 
signal of preference to donate then relatives may rely on their own attitudes towards 
donation to inform their decision to consent or veto.  
Ethical and Policy Implications 
The goal of the nudge policy is “to influence choice in a way that will make 
choosers better off, as judged by themselves” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 5). The 
justification for autonomy here is the preservation of free choice. Although defaults are 
powerful solutions for decreasing intention-behavior gaps in organ donation, the 
nudgers (choice architects – policy makers) can only go as far as constructing the choice 
architecture to increase the number of people on the ODR. Realistically, if the cost of 
opt-out is low, and if publicity and transparency are guaranteed, then there is far less 
threat to autonomy (Sunstein, 2015). However, our findings suggest that fewer than 50% 
of the participants in the default opt-in countries and only 19% from the default opt-out 
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countries have correctly identified the organ donation legislative system in their country, 
despite most recent survey showing around 80% of the population support organ 
donation ‘in principle’ (Department of Health & Social Care, 2017). Though this is 
cannot be taken as a direct comparison and given the selected samples recruited from 
Mturk and Prolific Academic, the implication of this finding should be read with care. 
Nonetheless, this illustrates a potential issue with the lack of awareness of organ 
donation legislations being implemented in their country, in particular, in presumed 
consent countries. This may help explain the weaker signal of perceived underlying 
preference to donate under a default opt-out system. In practical terms, this means if 
families are unaware that a default opt-out system has been implemented then the 
families are equally likely to believe that the deceased was also unaware of such system 
and may have forgotten to record an objection to donate during his/her lifetime. By 
inference, families are more likely to veto donation because, as revealed by our findings, 
signals attached to a default opt-out system suggest weaker perceived underlying 
preference to donate; this is because a passive choice was made as opposed to an active 
one. After all, the basis of a well-informed system is one which everyone should know 
about. One way to achieve this is through educational campaigns prior to the 
introduction of a new organ donation legislative system. This ensures that donors and 
especially families are aware of the intention and mechanism behind such systems. 
Indeed, the most recent consultation by Department of Health & Social Care (2017) 
highlighted that to implement a new system of consent successfully and support 
increased rates of organ donation, the government must consider an extensive 
communication campaign before and after the legislation comes into effect. 
Our view is therefore in line with Bovens’ (2009) and Johnson et al's (2013) 
which is that a default system would be a good policy, but only if people’s intentions 
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are clear and explicitly stated beforehand. We propose that effort should focus on 
promoting an active choice system which would provide clearer underlying preference. 
The Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) conducted one of the largest randomized 
controlled trials (1,085,322 individuals) ever run in the UK testing the effect of 
including different messages on a high traffic website on GOV.UK that encourages 
people to actively join the NHS ODR. The results showed that the best performing 
message was “if you needed an organ transplant, would you have one? If so please help 
others.” and the least performing message was “Every day thousands of people who see 
this page decide to register” which contained a picture (Behavioural Insights Team, 
2013). In 2014, the best performing message by itself lead to over 350,000 registrations 
for organ donation via the GOV.UK link (Loosemore, 2014). These findings suggest 
that a simple change of message can make a vast difference to the number of people 
actively signing up to the register. This type of online trial would also be more cost 
effective and less risky compared to implementing a default opt-out system, in addition 
to providing a clearer signal to families acting a proxy consent because as shown by 
our findings, the strength of underlying preference to donate is stronger under an active 
choice system. 
Last but not least, for any organ donation legislative systems, we recommend a 
two-way register. This means there is the option to register for both intentions, namely 
an expressed positive statement of intention to donate and objection to donate. An 
example of this is a mandated choice system introduced in our study which makes it a 
legal requirement that everyone must register their intention to donate or objection to 
donate during their lifetime. This reduces the noises from the signals attached to a 
system since an active choice is always made. A recent study has found that the most 
favorable system from the point of personal preference and the point of perception of 
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the norm for consenting to donation was the mandated choice system (Hammami et al., 
2012). Whilst argument could be made that it undermines autonomy because people 
are coerced to make a choice, if the aim is to respect individual autonomy then 
mandated choice promotes autonomy from the point of view that it ensures one’s 
preference is respected.  
Conclusion 
Family members often have to infer the deceased’s underlying preference from 
the choices they made, which can, in turn, we would argue, be affected by the signal 
attached to the organ donation legislative systems in place. We found that when an 
individual is registered as a donor under the mandated choice or default opt-in systems 
people judged this choice as more indicative of an underlying preference to donate, as 
compared to the default opt-out or mandatory donor systems. Since families play a 
central role in the organ donation process, measures should be implemented to 
minimize the noise/ambiguity in the signals attached to organ donation legislative 
systems. In the discussion, we offered three solutions that could potentially enhance the 
strength of the signal of underlying preference. These include educational campaign, 
increasing registration under an active choice system and adopting a two-way register. 
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that other factors also play a role in determining 
whether an increase in registered donors on the ODR translates into real increases in 
organ transplantation. These include but not limited to the number of hospitals carrying 
out transplants, the number of intensive-care beds available, relative refusing consent 
to donate, religious and cultural responses to cadavers, and public attitudes to and 
awareness of organ donation (Merchant et al., 2008; Mossialos et al., 2008; Shepherd 
et al., 2014); which should be factored into the implementation of legislation systems 
in order to evaluate the success of these systems.  
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Table 1.  
The combined general reasons in frequencies for opt-in and opt-out countries that John 
will consent to donate Mark's organs in each organ donation legislative system, where 
‘’ means this option was not displayed for that system. 
Reason for likely/moderately 
likely/highly likely to donate 




It is important to respect the 
deceased’s wish 
50 22 64 24 
This is a gift of life 8 23 15 33 
The act of good citizenship 7 18 7 39 
There is evidence to suggest that 
Mark wanted to donate his organs 
32 20 40 13 
He actively made a choice to opt-
in and donate his organs 
95 10 68 16 
Mark didn’t opt-out during his 
lifetime means he wanted to 
donate 
x 85 x x 
Mark couldn’t opt-out of 
becoming a donor anyway 
x x x 56 
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Table 2.  
The combined general reasons in frequencies for opt-in and opt-out countries that John 
will refuse to donate Mark's organs in each organ donation legislative system, where 
‘’ means this option was not displayed for that system. 
Reason for moderately 
unlikely/highly unlikely to donate 




It is a highly traumatic time for 
relatives and it's just not something 
they can think about 
1 5 3 1 
Lack of understanding of the organ 
donation process 
0 1 0 2 
Denial and rejection of brain-death 
criteria 
0 1 0 1 
The hope for a miracle 0 2 0 0 
Fear about organ trade and unknown 
organ destination 
1 0 0 0 
Religious belief 2 0 0 0 
Insecurity about the brain-death 
diagnosis 
1 0 0 0 
Unsure about Mark's wish to donate 0 4 1 2 
Belief in body integrity 1 0 0 1 
Fear about objection by other family 
members 
0 0 0 0 
There is a lack of evidence to indicate 
that Mark wanted to donate his 
organs 
2 1 1 2 
Because Mark didn't opt-out doesn't 
mean he wanted to donate his organs 
x 1 x x 
Mark was forced to donate his organs x x x 2 
Mark was forced to make a choice 
when he wasn't ready 
x x 0 x 
None of the above 0 0 0 0 
 UNDERLYING WISHES & NUDGED CHOICES 
 
45 
Table 3.  
Summary of main findings showing the effect of organ donation legislative systems on 
the five dependent variables when including the six covariates: 1) whether they were 
on the ODR, 2) whether they knew anyone that was on the ODR, 3) whether they were 
blood donors, 4) whether they would consent to donating their loved one’s organs even 
if their wishes were unknown, 5) whether organ donation was deemed as forbidden in 
their religion, and 6) whether they agree with the idea of a default opt-out system. 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
perceived belief of 
the donor’s 
underlying 
preference to donate 
F(3, 483) = 80.79, 
p < .001, η2 = .04 
F(3, 391) = 48.30, 
p < .001, η2 = .02 
F(3, 390) = 26.54, 
p < .001, η2 = .01 
perceived signal of 
donor’s intent to 
donate 
N/A F(3, 391) = 97.26, 
p < .001, η2 = .09 
F(3, 390) = 63.10, 
p < .001, η2 = .07 
likelihood estimates 
of the relative’s 
belief of the donor’s 
underlying 
preference to donate 
N/A F(3, 391) = 66.57, 
p < .001, η2 = .03 
F(3, 390) = 31.79, 
p < .001, η2 = .02 
perceived likelihood 
of the relative’s 
decision to consent 
to donate their 
family member’s 
organs 
F(3, 483) = 25.26,  
p < .001, η2 = .008 
F(3, 391) = 23.77, 
p < .001, η2 = .01 
F(3, 390) = 6.14, 
p < .001, η2 =.002 
perceived 
diagnosticity of 
people’s intention to 
donate 
F(3, 406) = 9.82, 
η2 = .03, p < .001 
 
F(3, 391) = 48.30, 
p < .001, η2 = .10 
F(3, 295) = 13.12, 
p < .001, η2 = .08 
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Table 4.  
Participants’ knowledge of the current organ donation legislation in their country: 
Study 1 (US, opt-in system), Study 2 (European country, opt-in system), and Study 3 
(European country, opt-out system). 
 What is the current legislation in your 
country? (%) 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Opt-out/Presumed consent 9.2 7.7 18.5 
Mandatory/compulsory 1.8 0.5 1.3 
Need to carry a donor card 0.8 21.9 9.0 
Opt-in 42.8 44.6 18.8 
Family or close friend will decide 8.7 3.7 8.8 














Figure 1. The scenario described in each organ donation legislative systems: 
Default Opt-In, Default Opt-out, Mandated Choice and Mandatory Donor.   
 
 




Figure 2. Mean perceived belief of the donor’s (i.e. Mark’s) underlying preference 
to donate across the four experimental conditions for Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3. 












Figure 3. Mean perceived signal of the donor’s (i.e. Mark’s) intention to donate 
across the four experimental conditions for Study 2 and Study 3.  Error bars are at 95% 
CI. 
  




Figure 4.  Mean perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s belief of the 
donor’s (i.e. Mark’s) belief of the donor’s (i.e. Mark’s) underlying preference to donate 
across the four experimental conditions for Study 2 and Study 3.  Error bars are at 95% 
CI. 
  




Figure 5. Perceived likelihood estimates of the relative’s decision to consent 
across the four experimental conditions for Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3. Error bar at 
95% CI. 
  




Figure 6. Mean perceived diagnosticity of people’s intention to donate across the 
































Figure 7.   Bayesian predictions of the effects of the organ donation legislative 
system and the direct ratings of belief in the donor’s (i.e. Mark’s) underlying preference 
to donate across the four experimental conditions for Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3. 
Error bars are 95% CI. 
